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Argument
I.

Petitioner's Position Concerning the Property Division Is
Unsupported By the Law and the Record.
In the decree of divorce, executed by the trial court, the court expressly

adopted the stipulation of the parties as to how the Delta Family Care Retirement
Plan would be divided. (Decree, at fl36, attached as Exhibit B to Respondent's
Initial Brief.) Petitioner now claims that the only stipulation or agreement was
with regards to a "T-Mobile" account, as opposed to a retirement account with
Delta, notwithstanding the express language of the divorce decree. Under
Petitioner's reasoning because the retirement plan discovered was supposedly
from another a company, there was no agreement. To the contrary, as Petitioner
acknowledges in her brief, her counsel expressly said a credit would be given as
an off-set if any account were found. (Br. of Appellee at 15; R. at 1020.)(ltalics
added.) The error in Petitioner's reasoning is further reflected in the decree and
findings of the district court, which both referred to "retirement with Delta Airlines,
T-Mobile." (Decree, at H36; Findings, at 1J72, attached as Exhibits B and C to
Respondent's Initial Brief.) Even while attempting to reverse her position on how
the account should be treated, Petitioner never claimed to the trial court that the
newly discovered account was anything other than that anticipated by the parties'
stipulation. Now that the case has reached this Court, Petitioner for the first time
claims that the account discovered is outside of the scope of the agreement.

To the contrary, the trial court's original decree and findings were plain in
outlining and adopting the stipulation regarding the retirement plan. That the
district court would sign these documents adopting the stipulation after the
hearing, expressly changing course, is virtually conclusive evidence of the court's
abuse of discretion.

II.

The District Court's Findings Were Insufficient.
The district court awarded Respondent only a future occurring Woodward

share without making adequate factual findings. As outlined in Respondent's
opening brief, Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), and its
progeny set forth specific considerations which should be considered by a trial
court in determining how and when to divide retirement benefits between
divorcing parties. While Petitioner speculates as to the considerations bearing
on the trial court's ultimate determination that distribution of the Delta Family
Care Retirement Plan should be delayed, the trial court took no evidence and
Petitioner proffered no evidence. There is nothing but unsupported speculation
by Petitioner's counsel and the trial court about the validity of expert opinion
proffered by Respondent.
It is clear that the trial court's on-the-record speculation as to the divisibility
of the retirement plan, without any evidentiary foundation is insufficient. In
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court stated:

"Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues is
reversible error unless the facts in the record are 'clear, uncontroverted,
and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.'... The
findings of fact must show that the court's judgment or decree 'follows
logically from, and is supported by, the evidence.' The findings 'should be
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached.'"
id. at 1078, citing, Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)(lnternal
citations omitted.) It is clear that the trial court should have set forth in findings of
fact the factual basis for its conclusion that the Delta Family Care Retirement
Plan had no present value and could not be divided along with the rest of the
marital property as the parties had anticipated, had agreed to do, and as the
district court had done with all of the other retirement accounts.
In this case, the only evidence that was proffered to the trial court
established just the opposite, namely that the plan had an ascertainable present
value. However, the trial court did not take evidence in this regard and made no
oral or written findings. The Supplemental Decree of Divorce summarily
concluded, "that the Respondent be awarded his Woodward share of the
Petitioner's defined benefit pension plan known as the Delta Family-Care
Retirement Plan through Delta Air Lines, Inc. ..." The trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to take evidence in this regard, ignoring the only evidence
proffered in this regard, and granting Respondent only a future Woodward share
rather than a present share in the plan without any evidentiary support. Indeed,
in her brief, Petitioner offers no substantive analysis of Woodward and its

progeny to support a contrary assertion. The decision of the district court should
be reversed.

III.

Petitioner's Arguments Are Barred By Judicial Estoppel.
In response to Respondent's contention that Petitioner's change in position

should be barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel, Petitioner argues that the
doctrine can not apply, claiming there was no prior judicial proceeding. Under
Petitioner's reasoning, the trial and each subsequent hearing is all part and
parcel of the same judicial proceeding. Petitioner cites no authority to support
this proposition.
Petitioner's claim is contrary to both caselaw and scholarly commentary on
the subject. While Respondent's research revealed no Utah caselaw addressing
this issue, as a general rule:
The principle, rule, or doctrine of estoppel to assume inconsistent positions
in legal proceedings applies generally to positions assumed not only in the
course of the same action or proceeding, but also to proceedings
supplemental thereto including proceedings for review or re-trial...
31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 138 (2007). In like manner, the United States Supreme
Court has stated, "Judicial estoppel 'generally prevents a party from prevailing in
one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory
argument to prevail in another phase.'" New Hampshire v. Maine. 532 US 742,
749 (2001), citing, Peqram v. Hedrich, 530 US 211, 227 n.8 (2000). Several
sister states have come to the same conclusion. See, e.g., Bank of Wichita v.

Ledford, 151 P.3d 103, 112 (Okla. 2006)(judicial estoppel applies to inconsistent
positions taken in the course of the same judicial proceeding) Jackson v. County
of Los Angeles, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96, 101-02 (Cal. App. 1997)(judicial estoppel
applies to positions taken "in the same or some earlier proceeding"); Cummings
v. Bahr, 685 A.2d 60, 66 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1996)0'udicial estoppel is
"equally applicable where a litigant asserts inconsistent legal positions in different
proceedings in the same litigation.")
In this case, Petitioner affirmatively represented to the district court in one
hearing or proceeding that there was no retirement account in order to obtain a
benefit for herself and that if one were discovered, Respondent should be
awarded a credit as an off-set to the property division. Petitioner successfully
maintained her prior position in that the court issued its oral and written findings,
awarding Petitioner a large cash property distribution and requiring Respondent
to refinance his assets to meet his obligation. Respondent relied on the prior
position by resting with the parties' stipulation and accepting the courts' promised
off-set or judgment. However, as soon as the evidence was uncovered to prove
Petitioner's representations false, Petitioner sought to avoid the effect of her prior
stipulation and representations. Under these circumstances, the elements of
judicial estoppel are met. Petitioner should be estopped from requesting
separate treatment for the Delta Family Care Retirement Plan.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein and those in Respondent's opening brief,
the district court abused its discretion in awarding Respondent only a Woodward
share in the Delta Family Care Retirement Plan and in failing to implement the
parties' stipulation. The district court further erred in allowing Petitioner to switch
its position under the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Respondent respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the determination of the district court and
remand the case with instructions to determine the present cash value of the
Delta Family Care Retirement Plan and to equitably divide the plan immediately.
Respondent requests oral arguments.
DATED this
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day of June, 2007.
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